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International Insolvency Review Draft April 22, 2019
CONFLICTING NORMS: IMPACT OF THE MODEL LAW ON
CHAPTER 11’s GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING ROLE
By:
G. Ray Warner1
The Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency2 is said to embody the concept of modified
universalism for cross-border insolvency matters.3 In a pure universalist system, a single
proceeding would deal with all of the debtor’s assets and debts globally.4 This is in contrast to a
purely territorial approach, where multiple local proceedings would be required; one in each
jurisdiction where the debtor had assets or debts, but each limited to the assets and debts located
in that jurisdiction.5 While universalism emphasizes the economic goals of insolvency theory –
to maximize the value of the estate and minimize the expense of the process -- territorialism
emphasizes (or at least recognizes) the sovereignty of the states where the assets of the debtor are
located or the effects of the insolvency proceeding are felt.
The modified universalist approach embodied in the Model Law reflects a compromise
between the theory of universalism and the practical realities of the territorial sovereignty
limitations on the effectiveness of any one state’s insolvency orders.6 It does this by accepting
that there would be multiple proceedings in different states and then trying to reduce the
inefficiencies that might create. Some of the inefficiencies can be reduced simply by
communication and cooperation, but often the goal of maximizing value requires that there be a
single plan for the resolution of the affairs of a single debtor. This requires coordination of the
multiple proceedings pending in diverse jurisdictions. Coordination will often require that one of
the local proceedings (the “main” proceeding) control the process and that the other proceedings
(the “secondary” proceedings) defer to that proceeding.7 The Model Law accomplishes this by
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permitting the courts in an adopting jurisdiction to grant additional relief to a foreign
representative from the main proceeding and encouraging deference to the main proceeding.8
From a purely universalist perspective, it should not matter which jurisdiction is the main
jurisdiction so long as its orders are enforceable in all other necessary jurisdictions.9 However,
had the Model Law incorporated such a view, it likely would not have been widely adopted.
Further, the courts in an enacting jurisdiction might be hesitant to grant relief to an insolvency
representative from a jurisdiction with little or no connection to the debtor.10 The Model Law
addresses this by designating as the main proceeding the one pending in the debtor’s “center of
main interest” or COMI. Selecting the proceeding with the most significant connection to the
debtor as the main proceeding also appeals to the historical insistence of most jurisdictions that
debtors must have a strong local connection to file a local insolvency proceeding. While the
Model Law does not define the center of main interest, it does create a presumption, absent proof
to the contrary, that a juridical entity’s center of main interest is located in the jurisdiction of its
registered office.11
In contrast the COMI-centric view embodied in the Model Law, the United States
domestic bankruptcy law adopts a very aggressive universalist approach to insolvency and
restructuring proceedings filed in the United States, but without any COMI requirement. There
are two primary aspects of the United States bankruptcy law that are critical to an understanding
of this contrast. First, the United States courts will entertain chapter 11 cases filed by entities
with almost no connection to the United States. Second, the United States chapter 11 has global
effect under United States law, even when the entity has no significant United States connection.
Put together, these features of United States law create a COMI-neutral universalist approach.
Unlike most insolvency regimes, the United States bankruptcy jurisdiction over juridical
entities is not limited to those with a registered office in the United States or even those with
significant operations in the United States. Instead, the mere existence of property in the United
States is a sufficient basis for instituting a United States chapter 11 proceeding.12 The relevant
statutory provision provides that “a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or
property in the United States … may be a debtor.”13 This provision has been interpreted very
liberally by the courts.14 Early cases indicated that any amount of property was sufficient, even a
bank account with a small balance.15 Further, that property could have been placed in the United
8
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States for the purpose of creating jurisdiction there.16 For example, in Global Ocean Carriers,17
funds sent to a United States lawyer as security for fees that would be earned during the
anticipated chapter 11 case were found to be sufficient.
The second relevant aspect of domestic United States insolvency law is that the United
States adopts the view that a United States insolvency proceeding has global effect.18 While this
is not a feature unique to United States law, the impact is far greater when the jurisdiction of the
court is not limited to domestic entities. The United States law grants the United States courts
“exclusive jurisdiction” over “all of the property, wherever located,” of the debtor.19 This
section brings into the United States proceeding all global assets of the entity.20 Thus, the United
States courts have jurisdiction over a foreign entity if it has any property in the United States, but
that jurisdiction extends to all property of the entity anywhere in the world. This jurisdiction
over both the entity and all its property means that, in theory, a United States chapter 11 could
deal with all of the assets and business operations of a foreign debtor and adjust the status of the
debtor by discharging or restructuring the claims against it, including those held by foreign
creditors.
It is one thing for a court to claim authority over all foreign assets and all foreign claims
of a foreign entity, but quite another to actually excise such broad authority. An order of a
United States court has no legal effect in a foreign territory unless the foreign court chooses to
give it effect. However, United States courts clearly do have the power to deal with any entity
and any assets located within the territory of the United States. This is the source of the practical
effectiveness of a foreign entity’s United States chapter 11. The United States has the world’s
largest economy and is an important commercial center. Almost any business that has or desires
global scale must have operations or engage in activities that involve the United States. Thus, it
is likely that most of the significant creditors and contract counter-parties of a debtor who files a
United States chapter 11 will either be United States entities or have United States interests that
could be at risk if the entity fails to abide by the orders of a United States court.21 Consequently,
the United States automatic stay that arises upon the filing of a United States chapter 11 is, as a
practical matter, a global moratorium because it enjoins all United States-connected creditors
from taking action against the debtor or its assets anywhere in the world.22 Similarly, the
discharge under United States law is a permanent injunction that can be enforced globally against
entities with United States interests.23
These features made the United States chapter 11 process an attractive option for
attempting a global restructuring of a global enterprise. Indeed, in many cases, the United States
16
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may have been the only jurisdiction where a global restructuring could be achieved. Until the
fairly recent trend toward adoption of rescue regimes, liquidation was the only option available
to many foreign debtors under their local laws. Thus, even if all assets and creditors were
subject to the foreign court’s jurisdiction, a proceeding filed there could not achieve a rescue.
The answer was a United States chapter 11, where the restructuring would be incorporated into a
chapter 11 plan of reorganization and the United States court order confirming the plan could be
enforced by threatening the United States-based interests of creditors, even if the foreign
jurisdiction would not recognize the chapter 11. Alternatively, even if the foreign home
jurisdiction had a functional rescue regime, a United States chapter 11 might be preferable if
major creditors or contract counter-parties had little at stake in the home jurisdiction and might
ignore the orders of the home court. Shipping companies provide an extreme example of this
scenario, because no jurisdiction’s moratorium could prevent the seizure of vessels in all other
nations’ ports. However, the practical power of the United States courts to enforce the automatic
stay has made chapter 11 an option for restructuring shipping companies.24
Prior to the adoption of the Model Law, the United States courts willingly accepted the
role as the world’s restructuring jurisdiction. They did this without regard to the location of the
debtor’s COMI or the extent of its connection to the United States, so long as it had at least some
property in the United States.
There were, however, some limits on the United States courts’ acceptance of chapter 11
cases filed by foreign debtors. While it is a general principle of United States jurisprudence that
a court is required to exercise the jurisdiction granted to it,25 the United States bankruptcy law
creates an exception that permits the bankruptcy court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction
over a bankruptcy case. This abstention doctrine permits a United States court to dismiss the
bankruptcy case or to suspend all proceedings in the case if “the interests of creditors and the
debtor would be better served by such dismissal or suspension.”26 The abstention provision
applies to all bankruptcy cases, not only those filed by foreign debtors. It is, however, a very
narrow exception that should be used only in extraordinary circumstances.27 In addition, it
requires that both the debtor and the creditors be better served by abstention.28 As a result, it was
rarely applied where a foreign debtor filed a voluntary chapter 11 case.29 Instead, its primary use
in cases involving foreign debtors was where disgruntled creditors filed United States
involuntary cases in order to undermine the pending foreign insolvency proceedings.30
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The United States’ adoption of the Model Law in 2005 added its COMI-centric view to
United States domestic bankruptcy law.31 That approach is at odds with the previously
established COMI-neutral principles of open access to chapter 11 and global enforcement of
United States orders. While the Model Law purports to deal only with cross-border cooperation
and coordination, does its COMI-centric approach create new limitations on the use of chapter
11 by foreign debtors? These limitations could appear as statutory provisions that restrict the use
of chapter 11 by foreign debtors or limit the geographic reach of a United States proceeding.
They also could appear as a reduction in the willingness of the United States courts to entertain
chapter 11 cases filed by foreign debtors. That could be reflected in an explicit reinterpretation
of the statutory “any property” requirement for eligibility, an explicit reinterpretation of the
statutory standard for abstention, increased exercise of the courts’ discretion to abstain without
explicitly changing the stated statutory standard, or application of non-statutory doctrines like
comity that permit deference to foreign proceedings.
There is some indication that the adoption of the Model Law did reduce the availability
and effectiveness of chapter 11 relief for foreign debtors. First, statutory changes that are part of
the Model Law and a few non-uniform provisions inserted by the United States as part of its
incorporation of the Model Law limit the availability of chapter 11 relief in a few situations.
These statutory provisions apply only where there are insolvency proceedings pending both in
the United States and in a foreign jurisdiction, but they do limit the chapter 11 options of foreign
debtors when the foreign proceeding is in the debtor’s COMI.
Article 28 of the Model Law addresses the situation where a domestic proceeding is
instituted after a foreign proceeding has been recognized as a foreign main proceeding.32 In such
a case, the Model Law provides that the effects of the domestic proceeding generally are limited
to assets within the domestic jurisdiction.33 Assets outside the jurisdiction can be administered in
the domestic proceeding, but only to the extent necessary to implement cooperation and
coordination under Model Law articles 25, 26 & 27.34 The United States version of the Model
Law appears in chapter 15 of its Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 15 adopts article 28 and thus
changes the prior United States law by limiting the effect of a chapter 11 case to United States
assets if the chapter 11 case is filed after recognition of a foreign main proceeding.35 That
provision does not change the effect of or the availability of chapter 11 relief if the chapter 11
case is commenced before any foreign proceeding has been opened.36 Nonetheless, article 28
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imports into domestic United States law a policy that chapter 11’s global reach can be trumped
by the Model Law’s principle of deference to the COMI jurisdiction.
Article 29 of the Model Law provides an important limitation on the Model Law’s
deference to the COMI jurisdiction.37 It appears to establish the primacy of the domestic
proceeding when it predates a foreign main proceeding.38 Normally, recognition of a foreign
main proceeding results in automatic relief under article 20 of the Model Law. But, if the
domestic case is commenced before the petition for recognition, then article 20 does not apply.
Further, any relief granted to the foreign representative must be consistent with the relief granted
in the domestic case.
Article 29 goes further and provides that even if the domestic case is commenced after
the filing of the petition for recognition, the relief granted to a foreign representative under
articles 19 and 21, and the automatic effects of a foreign main proceeding under article 20, shall
be modified or terminated if inconsistent with the relief granted in the domestic case.39 While
this provision appears to establish the primacy of the domestic case even if filed later, its impact
is severely restricted if the foreign proceeding is a foreign main proceeding. This is because
article 28 restricts the reach of the domestic case to local assets and thus the primacy granted by
article 29 is local and not global.
Nonetheless, while article 28 imposes new territorial limitations on the scope of chapter
11 in the rare situation where a chapter 11 case is commenced after recognition of a foreign main
proceeding, article 29 appears to validate the continued use of chapter 11 as a global
restructuring tool for foreign debtors in all other cases -- even when there is a pending
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insolvency] are taking place concurrently regarding the same debtor, the court shall seek cooperation and
coordination under articles 25, 26 and 27, and the following shall apply:
(a) When the proceeding in this State is taking place at the time the application for recognition of
the foreign proceeding is filed,
(i) Any relief granted under article 19 or 21 must be consistent with the proceeding in this
State; and
(ii) If the foreign proceeding is recognized in this State as a foreign main proceeding,
article 20 does not apply;
(b) When the proceeding in this State commences after recognition, or after the filing of the
application for recognition, of the foreign proceeding,
(i) Any relief in effect under article 19 or 21 shall be reviewed by the court and shall be
modified or terminated if inconsistent with the proceeding in this State; and
(ii) If the foreign proceeding is a foreign main proceeding, the stay and suspension
referred to in paragraph 1 of article 20 shall be modified or terminated pursuant to
paragraph 2 of article 20 if inconsistent with the proceeding in this State;
(c) In granting, extending or modifying relief granted to a representative of a foreign non-main
proceeding, the court must be satisfied that the relief relates to assets that, under the law of this
State, should be administered in the foreign non-main proceeding or concerns information
required in that proceeding.
Model Law Article 29.
38
The Guide to Enactment makes clear that this was intended. The Guide states, “[Article 29] maintains a preeminence of the local proceeding over the foreign proceeding.” Guide to Enactment, supra note 7, at 103, para. 231.
39
Model Law Article 29(b)(ii).

6

proceeding in the COMI jurisdiction.40 While this conclusion may be correct under the Model
Law, it may not be correct under the United States version of article 29.41 Although the United
States adopted the language of articles 28 and 29 with only minor changes, it added a new
subsection to its version of article 29.42 This new subsection refers to the United States
abstention provision discussed above. The United States provision states “In achieving
cooperation and coordination under sections 1528 and 1529 [articles 28 and 29 of the Model
Law], the court may grant any of the relief authorized under section 305 [the abstention
provision].”43 Does the United States abstention doctrine override the principles set forth in
articles 28 and 29 of the Model Law and what effect might that have on chapter 11’s continuing
availability as a global restructuring tool for foreign entities?
The United States abstention provision, section 305 of the Bankruptcy Code, was also
amended as part of the United States process of adopting the Model Law. Section 305 provided
two grounds for abstention. The first, discussed above, was the “interests of creditors and the
debtor” ground. That provision remained unchanged. However, the second provision was
revised to permit abstention if (1) a foreign proceeding had been recognized, and (2) “the
purposes of chapter 15 [the Model Law] … would be best served” by abstention.44
Unfortunately, the language of the new provisions does not make the relationship between them
as clear as it could be. Does the section 1529(4) reference to “the relief authorized under section
305” mean that abstention under section 1529(4) must satisfy one of the two grounds for
abstention listed in section 305? Or, does section 1529(4) add “achieving cooperation and
coordination under section 1528 and 1529” as a new ground for abstention and borrow only the
“relief” authorized by section 305, without incorporating any of the other features of section
305? This becomes important because United States courts tend toward a textualist approach45
to statutory interpretation, rather than a purpose-driven approach.46 Under a textual approach,
the presumption against surplus language is one of the most widely used canons of
construction.47 Thus, the addition of section 1529(4) to the law may mean that the only
permissible “cooperation and coordination” reasons for abstention must come from sections
1528 and 1529.
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Article 29 does, however, give the local court latitude to cooperate with the foreign court and to grant relief under
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How could this affect the use of chapter 11 by foreign debtors? As discussed above,
section 1528 and 1529 operate to give a United States chapter 11 case dominance over a foreign
main proceeding, except in the rare case that the chapter 11 is filed after recognition of a foreign
main proceeding. If the abstention power can be exercised only to further that structure, then it
prohibits abstention in a chapter 11 case that is filed before the petition for recognition since
there is nothing in section 1528 or 1529 that subordinates such a chapter 11 case to a foreign
proceeding. Thus, a United States court cannot abstain in a chapter 11 case involving a foreign
entity with property in the United States even if a proceeding in the COMI jurisdiction would be
in the best interests of both the creditors and the debtor.
An alternative view is that the section 1529(4) merely affirms what would be the result
under amended section 305 in any event. Specifically, that achieving cooperation and
coordination under section 1528 and 1529 is a purpose of chapter 15 so abstention is appropriate
under amended section 305(a)(2). Under this view, the addition of section 1529(4) changed
nothing and means nothing. That interpretation would allow section 305 to have full effect and
would permit abstention based either on the best interests of both creditors and the debtor or on
the purposes of chapter 15.
The first ground authorizes abstention in a United States chapter 11 case of a foreign
debtor if that is in the best interests of both the creditors and the debtor.48 Did that ground
remain unchanged when the United States adopted the Model Law, or does it now include
consideration of the COMI-centric policy of chapter 15? The textualist answer is no. While the
amended statute requires a United States court to consider the purposes of chapter 15 and to
abstain based on those purposes, it is authorized to do so only if a petition for recognition has
been granted.49 Thus, in the classic case where a foreign entity files chapter 11 before a foreign
proceeding has been recognized, the United States bankruptcy court has no statutory authority to
abstain based on COMI concerns.
However, at a later point in time, abstention may be available. If an insolvency
proceeding is commenced in the COMI jurisdiction and the foreign representative is granted
recognition, then the foreign representative may seek abstention based on the purposes of chapter
15.50 That leads to the question of what those purposes are. The Model Law states a purpose in
its preamble. That language is incorporated, with some changes, into section 1501(a) of United
States chapter 15.51 The provision is both exceedingly narrow and extremely broad.
48

See 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1).
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) with (a)(2).
50
For example, in In re Spanish Cay Co., Ltd., 161 Bankr. 715 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993), the United States case was
filed at a time when no foreign proceeding was pending. Since dismissal was not in the best interest of both the
debtor and the creditors, the court had no grounds to abstain under section 305(a)(1) and, since there was no pending
foreign proceeding, the earlier version of section 305(a)(2) did not apply. However, the court reasoned that it could
lift the automatic stay to permit the filing of a foreign proceeding and then abstain under former section 305(a)(2)
and its “comity” principle. Id. at 724.
51
Section 1501(a) provides:
(a) The purpose of this chapter is to incorporate the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency so as to
provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency with the objectives of-(1) cooperation between-(A) courts of the United States, United States trustees, trustees, examiners, debtors, and
debtors in possession; and
49
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The “purpose” language is quite narrow if the focus is on the introductory clause in
subsection (a). That language focuses on providing “effective mechanisms” for dealing with
cross-border cases.52 This appears limited to the specific provisions of the Model Law and the
mechanisms established by it. As discussed above, none of the specific mechanisms in the
Model Law address the use of chapter 11 as a global restructuring tool, especially when there is
no pending foreign proceeding. Under this narrow “mechanism” view of the purposes of chapter
15, abstention would be proper only where necessary to make a specific provision effective.
Consequently, abstention in a foreign debtor’s chapter 11 case never would be appropriate if the
chapter 11 case was commenced before the petition for recognition was filed because section
1529 gives primacy to the domestic proceeding in such cases.
On the other hand, the purpose provision is also broadly worded. After mentioning
“effective mechanisms” in the introductory clause, the section adds a list of very broadly-stated
“objectives.”53 If these are viewed as the purposes of the act, then the focus would be on
achieving those objectives. Abstention might be appropriate if it furthered one of those
objectives, even though no specific provision of the Model Law was implicated. The stated
objectives include “greater legal certainty for trade and investment” and “fair and efficient
administration of cross-border insolvencies”.54 Either of those objectives might be furthered by
United States courts refusing to exercise jurisdiction over chapter 11 cases lacking strong United
States connections. The objectives of greater legal certainty and fairness might even justify
abstention in any case lacking a United States COMI.
An even broader view of purpose would move away from the language of the purpose
provision and take a more holistic view of the Model Law. Under this view, a major purpose of
the law is to achieve the goals of modified universalism by designating a main proceeding and
encouraging all other proceedings to defer to it.55 This deference principle is similar to the
United States deference concept of international comity,56 but much more specific in that the
(B) the courts and other competent authorities of foreign countries involved in crossborder insolvency cases;
(2) greater legal certainty for trade and investment;
(3) fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects the interests of all
creditors, and other interested entities, including the debtor;
(4) protection and maximization of the value of the debtor's assets; and
(5) facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, thereby protecting investment and
preserving employment.
11 U.S.C. § 1501(a).
52
See 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a).
53
See 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1-5).
54
11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(2 & 3).
55
See Guide to Enactment, supra note 7, at 19, para. 1 (stating “the proceeding in the debtor’s centre of main
interests is expected to have primary responsibility for managing the insolvency of the debtor regardless of the
number of States in which the debtor has assets and creditors . . . .”)
56
The United States concept of comity dates to the 1885 Supreme Court case of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163.
It is difficult to define with precision and includes a number of related doctrines. See William S. Dodge,
International Comity in American Law, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2071 (2015). “Adjudicative comity” operates to limit
the exercise of United States courts’ jurisdiction with the aim of avoiding multiple parallel proceedings. Id. at 2105
& 2109-2112. Chapter 15 provides a legislative authorization that makes United States courts more willing to
abstain in favor of foreign proceedings in bankruptcy matters. Id. at 2112 n. 254.
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Model Law recognizes as the main proceeding the one pending in the jurisdiction with the
strongest connection to the debtor.57 Indeed, a proceeding like many chapter 11 global
restructurings, where the debtor has no United States connection other than assets,58 is entitled to
no deference at all under the Model Law.59 This view of purpose emphasizes the COMI-centric
policy of the Model Law. Under that approach, the United States courts should exercise their
board jurisdiction only if other Model Law purposes, such as the need for fair administration,
protection and maximization of assets, and facilitation of a rescue, override the COMI policy.
This may be the case, for example, where it is not possible to have an effective proceeding in the
COMI jurisdiction.60 But this would convert chapter 11 from a global restructuring tool of first
resort to the tool of last resort.
Beyond the small change to chapter 11’s reach made by section 1528, the legislative
changes made in connection with the United States’ adoption of the Model Law do not clearly
alter the prior law. However, the COMI-centric approach of the Model Law and the adoption of
that approach as a global norm may affect how United States courts interpret domestic law.
There is some indication that this is beginning to occur and that judicial attitudes are changing
about the appropriateness of allowing a United States chapter 11 filing when adequate relief is
available in the COMI jurisdiction.61
Thus far, the change is limited to cases interpreting the section 305 abstention provision.
No reported cases suggest that the liberal section 109 test for jurisdiction is changing. The postadoption section 305(a)(1) cases have restated the abstention test to add a new factor when a
foreign insolvency proceeding is pending. The new version of the test requires consideration of
the doctrine of international comity and its principle of deference to foreign insolvency
proceedings. However, while the articulation of the abstention test has changed, that change
does not yet appear to have changed the analysis of the courts employing it. Nonetheless, the
United States’ notion of international comity bears some similarity to the Model Law goals of
cooperation and coordination and its inclusion in the abstention test so soon after chapter 15’s
adoption arguably reflects the Model Law’s influence on domestic United States law. On the
other hand, if Model Law policies were seeping into United States chapter 11 jurisprudence, the
cases should reflect the Model Law’s strong emphasis on the COMI. They do not. The United
States courts continue to employ a balancing approach that compares the effectiveness of a
foreign restructuring to the effectiveness of a United States restructuring. That analysis may
include consideration of COMI factors, but the decisions do not use COMI terminology or
mention the Model Law. Thus, it appears that the Model Law has not yet had much impact on
the willingness of United States courts to be the world’s restructuring jurisdiction.

57

See Model Law Article 2(b) (defining foreign main proceeding).
See, e.g., Global Oceans, supra note 17.
59
See Model Law Article 2(c & f) (requiring an “establishment”).
60
Professor Westbrook suggests that this might be a situation that permits a non-COMI restructuring. Westbrook,
supra note 10, at 1487-88.
61
See; Shuster & Loveland, supra note 29, at 43; see also Josefina Fernandez McEvoy, Tallying Involuntary
Insolvency Proceedings in the Wake of Chapter 15, 27 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 34, 34 & 65 (Mar. 2008); Francis G.
Conrad & Richard J. Corbi, Cross-Border Bankruptcy Update: Do U.S. Bankruptcy Courts Have the Final Say?. 27
Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 42, 42 & 82 (Aug. 2008).
58
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A case decided only two years after the United States’ adoption of the Model Law has
been heralded as an example of its COMI-centric principles replacing chapter 11’s traditional
COMI-neutral approach.62 That case involved a motion to abstain in an involuntary United
States chapter 11 case filed by dissatisfied creditors of a foreign company that was subject to a
long-running insolvency proceeding pending in Argentina.63 The COMI clearly was in
Argentina, with the business’ operations centered there, all employees located there and 98% of
its customers there.64 In fact, the related enterprise group was Argentina’s largest bread
producer, controlling 63% of the country’s packaged bread market.65 The connection to the
United States was exceedingly thin. The only property in the United States was one United
States trademark and three pending trademark applications.66 The court’s analysis began with a
recitation of the typical section 305(a)(1) factors used to evaluate whether the interests of both
creditors and the debtor are better served by dismissal. But then it added the following language,
“Although abstention under § 305 is considered an extraordinary remedy [citations omitted], the
pendency of a foreign insolvency proceeding alters the balance by introducing considerations of
comity into the mix.”67
That language represents a major departure from the traditional section 305(a)(1)
analysis. The focus of section 305(a)(1) had been solely on the interests of creditors and the
debtor. In contrast, comity has almost nothing to do with those interests but, instead, focuses on
the relationship between sovereigns and the respect that should be accorded to the laws and
courts of a foreign nation.68
The timing of the Fargo decision, coming only two years after the United States adopted
the Model Law, strongly suggests that its incorporation of international comity into the section
305(a)(1) abstention analysis was influenced by the Model Law. But, if that were the case, one
would expect the court to at least mention the Model Law in its decision because that would
provide some authority for deferring to the foreign proceeding. The Fargo opinion does not
mention the Model Law or chapter 15. Nor does it refer to Model Law concepts. For example,
although Argentina clearly was the COMI, and the only jurisdiction with any real interest in the
businesses’ insolvency, the Fargo court never used the term “center of main interest.” The
absence of such references does not result from ignorance of the Model Law. The Fargo judge,
Stuart M. Bernstein of the Southern District of New York, was very familiar with the Model Law
and its concepts, having already published at least two decisions discussing chapter 15 by the
time the Fargo opinion was issued on October 12, 2007.69 Nonetheless, it remains possible that

62

See Shuster & Loveland, supra note 29; McEvoy, supra note 61.
In re Compania de Alimentos Fargo, S.A., 376 Bankr. 427, 429 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2007). The court suggests the
United States proceeding may have been instituted to “hijack” the Argentine proceeding or to increase the
disgruntled creditors’ leverage in any negotiations. Id. at 441.
64
Id. at 429.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 439.
67
Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
68
See Hilton v. Guyot, supra note 55, at 163.
69
See In re Euro-American Lodging Corp., 357 Bankr. 700 (Jan. 9, 2007); In re Petition of Wurthrich, 337 Bankr.
262, 266 n. 3 (2006). In addition, Judge Bernstein issued a third reported decision discussing chapter 15 less than
three weeks after issuing the Fargo decision. See In re Bancredit Cayman Ltd., 2007 WL 3254369 (Nov. 2, 2007).
63
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the Model Law’s expression of a new global insolvency norm of cooperation and deference
influenced the decision.
Although there are few reported cases dealing with abstention,70 subsequent cases
repeated the comity language and suggested that comity might be more important than the
traditional abstention factors.
In Monitor Single Lift, the court rephrased the Fargo principle as, “While all factors are
considered, not all are given equal weight in every case. Where there is a pending foreign
proceeding, concerns of comity must be taken into account and deference must be given to the
foreign proceedings.”71 Thus, only one year after Fargo, comity had gone from simply being in
the mix of factors to being one that must be taken into account, with deference added as
something that must be given to the foreign proceeding. The Monitor court’s phrasing also
suggests that comity is more important than most, if not all, of the traditional factors.72
Notwithstanding its expansive restatement of the Fargo test, the Monitor court did not abstain
from the foreign debtor’s chapter 11 case because the pending foreign proceeding involved an
affiliate and not the entity that filed chapter 11.73 While the Monitor court’s discussion of
comity was mere dicta, the court accepted and arguably expanded the Fargo doctrine. This is
how a single decision can evolve into a trend.
The Fargo doctrine reappeared recently in what may be the most prominent example of a
United States court declining to exercise jurisdiction over a global restructuring case -- the
attempted chapter 11 restructuring of the Baha Mar resort in The Bahamas.74 Although a few of
the related debtor entities had United States connections, bankruptcy jurisdiction over several of
the debtors was based on United States bank accounts established days before the chapter 11
filings.75 The focus of the case was the unfinished 3.3 million square foot resort that was
expected to represent 12% of the GDP of The Bahamas once operational.76 Although the court
did not engage in a COMI analysis, COMI certainly was located in The Bahamas for most of the
debtor entities. The debtor entities chose chapter 11 because allegedly the only option under
Bahamian law was a liquidation proceeding.77 The United States bankruptcy court decided to
abstain and, in its published decision, devoted several paragraphs to a discussion of comity.
After quoting extensively from the Fargo opinion, the court stated, “Here, considerations of
comity support abstention pursuant to § 305(a).”78 Like the Fargo decision, the Northshore
Mainland opinion does not appear to rely upon the Model Law or its concepts. The opinion does
refer to the “center of main interest” and the principle of modified universality, but only in its
quotation of the Bahamian judge’s opinion in its factual summary.79 However, the court did
70

One commentator noted that there is little case law on the general abstention provision, section 305(a)(1), and
even less on the provision dealing with pending foreign proceedings, section 305(a)(2). Mazek, supra note 27.
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In re Monitor Single Lift I, Ltd., 381 Bankr. 455, 465 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2008).
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Accord Conrad & Corbi, supra note 61, at 81.
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Monitor Single Lift, supra note 71, at 465-67.
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See In re Northshore Mainland Services, Inc., 537 Bankr. 192 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015).
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Id. at 201.
76
Id. at 195-96.
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Id. at 205.
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Id. at 208.
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Id. at 198.
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discuss the expectations of stakeholders used the term “main” insolvency proceeding to assert
that the parties would not have expected the main insolvency proceeding to be in the United
States.80
With two New York judges and one Delaware judge adopting the comity language, both
of the major United States cross-border jurisdictions appear to have changed the test for
abstention under section 305(a)(1). Commentators took notice and viewed the Fargo, Monitor,
and Northshore decisions as the beginning of the end of the United States courts’ role as a global
restructuring jurisdiction. For example, one commentator viewed the Northshore case as part of
a trend toward a regime where chapter 15 will not be simply one option for foreign debtors but
will become the exclusive type of United States bankruptcy protection available.81
That view seems to read too much into the decisions. While it is undeniable that Fargo
and its progeny do add comity to the section 305(a)(1) analysis,82 there is no evidence that
change results from the adoption of Model Law and its COMI-centric principles. First, although
the cases give lip-service to the comity principle, it did not appear to affect their section
305(a)(1) analysis. The Monitor case did not grant abstention and, although both Fargo and
Northshore granted abstention, both cases involved classic scenarios where abstention was
appropriate under the pre-chapter 15 law. Fargo involved the classic case of recalcitrant
creditors filing an involuntary bankruptcy to undermine a pending proceeding. This is such a
common situation justifying abstention that it was mentioned in the legislative reports
accompanying section 305.83 In Northshore, opposition to the chapter 11 proceeding by the
Bahamian courts and the Bahamian government meant that the United States court lacked the
80

The court stated:
Notwithstanding some agreed venue provisions in some of the relevant documents, I agree with Justice
Winder's determination in his July 31, 2015 ruling that many stakeholders in the Project would expect that
any insolvency proceedings would likely take place in The Bahamas, the location of this major
development Project. I perceive no reason—and have not been presented with any evidence—that the
parties expected that any “main” insolvency proceeding would take place in the United States. In business
transactions, particularly now in today's global economy, the parties, as one goal, seek certainty.
Expectations of various factors—including the expectations surrounding the question of where ultimately
disputes will be resolved—are important, should be respected, and not disrupted unless a greater good is to
be accomplished. Under these circumstances, I can perceive no greater good to be accomplished by
exercising jurisdiction over these chapter 11 cases, except for that of [a Delaware subsidiary].
Id. at 206.
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Shuster & Loveland, supra note 29, at 42; see also McEvoy, supra note 61 (discussing Fargo and questioning
whether the United States remains a viable option for involuntary cross-border chapter 11 cases).
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This appears to result from two errors by the Fargo court. First, comity has long been an important abstention
factor, but only under the second prong of section 305. That provision, prior to the adoption of chapter 15, permitted
abstention based on section 304(c) factors when a foreign proceeding was pending. The primary section 304(c)
factor was comity. Thus, Fargo conflated the analysis under former section 305(a)(2) with the standards under
section 305(a)(1). Further, since section 304(c) was repealed in 2005 and section 305(a)(2) was amended to refer
only to cases where a chapter 15 petition for recognition had been granted, there was no statutory basis for
considering comity in Fargo, Monitor, or Northshore because none involved recognition of a foreign proceeding.
The second error was the Fargo court’s reliance on cases that dealt with the very different abstention issue of
declining to adjudicate in collateral United States lawsuits creditor claims that are the subject of a foreign insolvency
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inserting comity into the section 305(a)(1) analysis.
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See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 325 (1977); S. Rep. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1978).
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ability to effectively restructure the business.84 This is another typical reason for dismissing a
United States case. It is simply a practical application of the statutory test that measures whether
dismissal is in the best interest of the debtor and creditors. Where the bankruptcy proceeding
cannot achieve its purpose, dismissal is appropriate.85 Finally, neither Fargo nor Northshore
mention the Model Law or use COMI terminology in reaching their conclusions. Thus, neither
decision is driven by the COMI-centric policy of the Model Law. 86 Indeed, although both cases
discuss factors that would be included in a COMI analysis, it is clear that those factors are
discussed as part of a traditional section 305(a)(1) balancing analysis of the relative benefits of
the United States and foreign proceeding,87 with no presumption that the COMI is the proper
jurisdiction for a global restructuring.
Thus, it appears that chapter 11 remains a global restructuring tool and that the COMIcentric policies of the Model Law have not changed that very much. The Fargo line of authority
applies only where a foreign proceeding is pending and has no impact in cases like Monitor
where the United States chapter 11 is only insolvency proceeding filed. However, even where a
foreign insolvency proceeding is pending, Fargo and its progeny call for a balancing approach
that will permit a United States chapter 11 global restructuring to proceed if it is a better option
than the foreign proceeding, regardless of the location of COMI.

The Bahamian Attorney General opposed the debtors’ request for recognition of the chapter 11 cases by the
Bahamian courts and the request was denied. Northshore Mainland, supra note 74, at 197-200.
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See. e.g., In re Int’l Zinc Coatings & Chemical Corp, 355 Bankr. 76, 85 & 87 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (noting there
was no reason to have a bankruptcy case and that the proceeding must have a legitimate bankruptcy purpose); In re
Bos, 561 Bankr. 868, 900-01 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2016) (evaluating the benefit of a bankruptcy liquidation). Compare,
In re Yukos Oil Co, 321 Bankr. 396, 411 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (dismissing chapter 11 case under section 1112
because the cooperation of the Russian government was required to restructure a business with the vast majority of
its assets located in Russia).
86
Although he dismissed the cases of the Bahamian debtors, the Northshore Mainland judge reaffirmed the view
that a United States chapter 11 would be an appropriate restructuring vehicle for those debtors. Expressing his
frustration with the creditors’ and the Bahamian government’s refusal to negotiate, Judge Carey stated:
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, with all stakeholders participating, under these
circumstances, would be an ideal vehicle for the restructuring of this family of related companies with the
ultimate goal of finishing a project said to be 97% complete and, upon its exit from chapter 11, to be in
sound financial footing, with appropriate treatment of creditors. I am consequently disappointed that the
parties have been so far unable to formulate a consensual exit strategy, whether that would involve taking a
plan to confirmation or providing an agreed dismissal as part of a consensual resolution of their disputes.
Northshore Mainland, supra note 74, at 206.
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The practical focus of the Northshore Mainland decision is clear from Judge Carey’s statement that he “might
consider denying the Dismissal Motion” if that would bring the major creditors and the government of The Bahamas
“back to the bargaining table.” Id.
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